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The potential constraints on a ring structured distributed
computing system imposed by the shipboard environment were
discussed. The feasibility of increasing distributed ring
system availability to meet the requirements were investi-
gated. It was shown that with a multiply linked ring struc-
ture, shipboard environmental effects would not severely
degrade successful operation of a distributed system. This
finding could result in the utilization of distributed ring
computing systems with suitably redundant data path schemes
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The purpose of this thesis was to investigate the feasi-
bility of instituting a high degree of system availability
in ring structured distributed computing systems in order
to make them compatible with shipboard environments. A
significant amount of effort was given to introducing re-
dundant data links and highly redundant ring hardware in
achieving this higher state of availability. Prior to the
beginning of this study, the distributed ring computing
system concepts were studied to ensure that the problems
unique to this system study were well understood.
Although the concept of distributing ring computing
systems is relatively recent, significant research has been
conducted both in the civilian academic environment and at
the Naval Postgraduate School. Chapter II examines this
background information and gives an overview and functional
description of distributed ring system software and hardware
concepts.
In the earlier sections of Chapter III, the specific
rationale for investigating methods of increased system
availability and reliability in a shipboard environment
are developed. In the central sections of Chapter III,
11

specific designs of data path redundancy as possible ways
of increasing system availability in distributed ring systems
are discussed and resultant system availability calcula-
tions are derived. A significant amount of difficulty was
encountered in developing the complicated mathematical
models for one system design in particular. While several
approaches to system availability calculations were attempted,
only one proved to produce reasonable results. A detailed
discussion of the system calculations developed can be found
in the latter sections of Chapter III as well as a discussion
of the results of data path redundant designs as they impact
on overall system availability improvement.
Chapter IV discusses a potential redundant hardware
design of a data ring interface utilizing current micro-
computer technology. Finally, Chapter V summarizes the




Given the notable advancements in computer system tech-
nology, coupled with the decreasing costs of hardware, the
concept of establishing Distributed Ring Computing Systems
(DRCS) using present micro and mini-computer hardware has
become increasingly popular. The main features of this
type of system which make it so desirable over other possible
system configurations, are the greater flexibility of the
system, its reduced costs, and its processor-independent
communications protocols.
In view of the above mentioned advantages, applications
of the ring structured computing systems to naval shipboard
designs appear highly desirable. Historically, the par-
ticular information transfer needs of electronic subsystems
on shipboard platforms have been met by installing dedicated
cabling throughout the hull. With the ring structured
communication network, given suitable redundancy in network
paths, the situation should never again arise where ship
subsystems will be functionally dependent upon a single
thin thread of dedicated wiring. The distributed ring
computing system with path redundancy will provide multiple,
physically separated paths throughout the ship which will
13

increase information transfer capacity and operational
survivability.
Considerable research into configuration and uses of
the ring structured distributed computing systems has been
conducted by David Farber /Ref . 27 of the University of
California at Irvine as well as by students and faculty
at the Naval Postgraduate School /Ref s . 4, 5, 7, 9, 147.
In reference 11 Professor Farber discusses the increased
reliability achieved in a ring structured system by dis-
tributing control of the ring among active users with a
"Fail Soft" philosophy of control. The concept of "Fail
Soft" systems is one where systems exhibit the property
of controlled system degradation rather than total failure
as a result of component failure. At the Naval Postgraduate
School (NPS) a ring data communication system utilizing
microprocessor technology has been designed and tested.
There is no intention at this time to reiterate the argu-
ments regarding the overall advantages of the ring struc-
tured computer systems over other possible configurations.
These arguments are more than amply covered in the refer-
ences. What is intended is to investigate and discuss the
system reliability advantages of a suitably redundant
version of a ring structured computer information system
and to analyze its advantages in higher reliability.
14

A. BASIC CONCEPTS OF A RING STRUCTURED DISTRIBUTED
COMPUTING SYSTEM
A distributed computing system is process oriented.
That is, most system services are processes. Within each
processor connected to the distributed computing system is
a resident software nucleus which provides local resource
management and interprocess communication services.
The key element to the distributed computing system is
the method of communication between processors. To gain
maximum flexibility the system should:
1. Distribute control of the system (no one processor
is in control of the system at all times)
.
2. Execute processes without regard to their physical
location.
3. Permit communication between processes without
regard for their physical locations.
The first goal is necessary to ensure that catastrophic
failure does not occur to the system if one processor or
process fails. The second two goals ease the job of
dynamic reconfiguration of the system.
In a ring structured system each processor in the net-
work is connected to a unidirectional high speed communica-
tion ring by a ring interface (see FigureU-1). Only the












FIGURE II - 1. RING COMMUNICATION NETWORK
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system can transmit a message. Messages are directed to a
process by name, as opposed to physical location, so that
where a particular process resides in the system is not
important to the message sender (location independence)
.
Message transmission is accomplished through a combina-
tion of hardware and software. Transmitting a message from
one process to another causes the message to be passed
around the ring from station to station and to be copied
into the processor on which the destination process resides
by that processor's ring interface. Each ring interface has
a list of the processes resident in its processor. As a
message passes by, a ring interface compares the destina-
tion process name in the message with the list of process
names, copies those messages for which there is a match
into the attached processor, and sets status bits at the
end of the message indicating whether or not the message
was copied, not copied, or copied incorrectly. Notice,
however, that while a ring interface is receiving a message
from the ring and delivering it to the host, it does not
remove the message from the ring. Instead, it merely
copies it, one byte at a time. This means that the message
continues around the ring and may be sent to more than one
process in a single transmission sequence. This accom-
plishes the second goal, communicating between processes
17

regardless of their physical location. When the message
finally returns to the sending ring interface it is taken
from the ring and the status bits are sent to its processor
to be checked for successful reception of the message.
Only the ring interface in control of the system can
transmit a message. Once the interface in control has
completed its message transmission and receipt, control is
passed to the next ring interface. In this manner control
is distributed among all ring interfaces. The actual con-
trol of the ring is passed around by means of a "control
token." A ring interface may transmit a single message
only when it possesses the control token. This guarantees
that only one ring interface has control at one time. Inde-
pendent timers in the ring interfaces ensure that no one
ring interface monopolizes the ring and if control is lost,
control will be regained by one of the other ring inter-
faces. The important thing to consider is that all ring
interfaces have the capability to take control of the ring
and that only one ring interface will have control at a
time under normal operation.
In order to punctuate the continuous flow of data on
the ring, two additional control type tokens are defined.
The Start of Message (SOM) token is used to tell all re-
ceiving ring interfaces that a message is to follow. The
18

End of Message (EOM) token tells the ring interface two
things: First, it tells the ring interface that there is
no more information to relay to its host. Secondly, it
signals the CRC (error detecting) circuitry to check its
remainder for a transmission error. In the basic format
of the message sent, the SOM token is followed by the name
of the addressee, followed by the message data. At the
end of the message is the EOM token which is followed
by several bits used to check for proper receipt of the
message.
B. HARDWARE COMPONENTS OF A RING STRUCTURED SYSTEM
Each station on the distributed ring structured system
is subdivided into functional hardware/ firmware components,
each having specific responsibilities. Figure II-l shows
a conceivable ring communication configuration where a
"station" is defined as a host processor together with its
ring interface. In the earlier days of distributed com-
puting systems the ring interface and its associated com-
ponents were frequently hardwired. Such is the case of the
ring interface developed by Farber at the University of
California at Irvine /Ref. 37. At the Naval Postgraduate
School, however, a modular approach was taken in designing
a cost effective and more flexible ring interface with
19

emphasis on firmware replacing hardware wherever possible.
The following, therefore, is an overview of the functional
responsibilities of the key hardware/ firmware components
of the ring distributed computing system as envisioned at
the Naval Postgraduate School /Ref. 47. Station 1 in
Figure II-l shows the logical subdivision of each station
into functional hardware/firmware components.
1. The Repeater
The repeater (r. in Figure II-l) provides the neces-
sary signal boost to drive messages over long cable lengths.
It is designed to be directly connected to the ring, recover
the messages, recover clocking information, and pass on
cleaned up, reshaped data to the outbound cable. The
physical design of the repeater is dependent on several
characteristics of the actual system hardware. That is,
the cable length between stations, the cable type, the types
of receiver/drivers used, and ring speed each in its own
way affects repeater design. It should be noted that the
NPS hardware/ firmware design physically combines the re-
peater with the ring interface module. In this report most
references to the "ring interface" include the characteris-
tics and functions of both of these components.
20

2. The Ring Interface
In Figure II-l, although different processors are
connected to the ring, the functions performed by each
ring interface (RI) is to be the same at all stations:
(a) Data and control tokens traveling along the
ring are to be received, evaluated and re-
transmitted.
(b) Certain checking functions are to be performed
and status information is to be sent to the
host processor.
(c) Control signals from the host processor must
be acknowledged and complied with.
A ring interface incorporates all these functions in
the most efficient manner independent of any host processor.
Each host processor communicates with its ring interface via
a device which adapts the general purpose ring interface
to the host computer's specific needs. The module performing
this role is the Host Adapter.
3. The Host Adapter
The Host Adapter (HA) in essence acts as an inter-
preter between the host processor and the ring interface.
The host adapter is designed for a particular station and
as such is dependent on the host processor being served.
In some cases, host processors can be linked directly to
21

the ring interface with the host adapter functions being
accomplished by the host software.
The foregoing has been a general discussion and
introduction into the basic hardware/ firmware concepts of
the ring structured distributed system. For a detailed
discussion, reference should be made to Hirt /Ref. 57,





A FAILURE CONDITIONS IN RING STRUCTURED COMPUTING SYSTEMS
1. The Effects of Battle Damage
One of the more important questions being addressed
in this chapter is consideration of system availability for
various ring system configurations. Controlled degradation
of performance under failure conditions is one of the great-
est potential advantages of the ring structured distributed
computing^system. Almost all previous work with these ring
systems has dealt with the single ring system concept which
did not have to attempt to survive the most obvious failure
modes in a shipboard military environment, that of battle
and collision damage and component failure. Since the
probability of a shipboard ring being severed by battle
damage is very real, it has to be considered seriously. A
system failure caused by component malfunction has to be
localized and then repaired or bypassed unless there is
sufficient redundancy built into the system.
2
.
System Failure and Maintainability
Aside from the effects of battle damage, the impact
of system maintenance on overall system availability must
be considered. Given any system where performance requirements
23

are met, the addition of capability to ensure continuous
reliable performance during routine and emergency mainten-
ance situations is essential. This is especially true
where system performance criteria require a certain amount
of maintenance actions be accomplished. It is desirable to
continue system operation even during maintenance actions,
when some components will be out of service.
A ring communication system would be particularly
affected by the choice of backup capabilities incorporated
into the overall system design. For example, consider de-
signing a system where the tradeoffs are increased perform-
ance at a cost of more lengthy repair times. If failure is
very rare, then repair times are less important. On the
other hand, if frequent system repair is anticipated, the
excessive repair times with their associated costs and sys-
tem degradation may far outweigh performance advantages.
Where battle damage, everyday system failures, and
maintenance actions occur, it is clear that one possible
solution to sustained performance is to include some sort
of path (cable) redundancy in the design of the ring to
provide alternate message paths when some elements fail.
If as expected, the increase in redundancy will enhance
system availability, then the increase in availability
24

will also directly contribute to the control of degradation
of performance under failure or maintenance conditions.
In order to investigate the potential of increased
redundancy as a key to enhanced ring system availability,
the following sections will describe in detail two alterna-
tives for such availability enhancement using added
transmission paths.
B. THE POTENTIAL OF REDUNDANCY FOR IMPROVING SYSTEM
AVAILABILITY
1. Protective Redundancy
Redundancy (the availability of more than one means
of performing a function when fewer are required) is a
principal method of achieving increased reliability. In
the two alternative methods to be discussed later in this
thesis, active parallel redundancy will be considered to
improve system availability.
Where systems are operated together with all oper-
able (unfailed) systems performing the function all the
time, a system is said to be active parallel redundant.
An aircraft which can still fly when two of its four engines




2. Application of Path Redundancy to a Distributed
Ring Computing System
The potential of damage or disruption to a shipboard
ring in a battle environment is very real and critical to
a ship's fighting ability. Once a ring system suffers a
severed or degraded communication path, link, or repeater,
the following conditions must be met to continue operation
of the ring:
(a) The condition that the ring has been cut or
degraded must be detected.
(b) The disruption in the ring must be located.
(c) The disruption must be repaired or bypassed.
As soon as the ring has been disrupted, the station
immediately after the disruption will be aware of the situa-
tion. If the ring is without redundancy the system will
remain inoperative until the disruption is repaired. It is
obvious that some kind of path redundancy must be built into
the ring to allow for the localization and/or bypassing of
damage to ensure a continuity of operation. The following
two system concepts, Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) and
Triply Redundant Multiple Paths (TRMP)
,
provide alternative
approaches to the problem of installing path redundancy to
the distributed ring system. Both approaches deliver sig-




C. SPECIFIC REDUNDANCY SPECIFICATIONS
1. Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR)
The TMR approach for adding redundant paths to
the distributed computing ring system described in Chapter
II is the most direct and least complex. In the classical
"N" modular redundancy approach to the ring system there
are some number, N, of complete communication paths between
stations on the ring. For the sake of clarity and to reduce
complexity of discussion, the Triple Modular Redundant Case
(N=3 paths) will be discussed. The concept of three complete
paths between stations is analogous to having three complete
data rings in the system with the three rings going through
each station. Figure III-l illustrates a TMR configuration
for a ring system with five stations.
In TMR, all stations would listen to one of the in-
coming paths until such time that an error is detected. If
an error were detected while a message is being transmitted,
the station would wait for a retransmission of the message
on the same path. If an error is again detected, the
listening station would send on the outbound path detected
as providing erroneous data, a high priority message direct-
ing each station to switch output path transmissions to a
preselected backup path. Once this switching of paths has


































completed. These specific synchronization procedures which
are necessary for initializing the ring are discussed in
depth by Harris /Ref. 47, and will not be elaborated here.
Referring to Figure III-l, it can be seen that the
five stations are represented in a serial arrangement, each
station designated by S^ where i = 1,2,3,4,5. The stations
themselves are divided into two separate modules; the
repeater module (r) and the data path module (p)
.
The repeater module consists of the ring interface/
repeater hardware as well as the selector switch circuitry
which picks which of the three incoming data paths is to be
used as primary path of communication to the host computer.
In essence, the repeater module is the cornerstone of each
station in TMR since failure of any single repeater module
causes a system failure.
Having brought up the topic of system failure, at
this time it would be advisable to state specifically, the
conditions for an operational system; a system (TMR, TRMP)
is operational if: given that a specific station is oper-
ating, a transmission path exists such that it is possible
for the given station to transmit a message around the ring
and back to itself.
It can be seen that both the repeater and data path
modules play a key part in system success. The data path
29

module (p) is composed of the three redundant paths of
communication between successive repeater modules (see
paths A., B., C. in Figure III-l) . Each path is the line
of communication from the output of one repeater to the
input of the following repeater module.
For the purposes of calculating system reliability
in TMR, each repeater module (r) and each data path module
(p) are assigned a specific availability value. Availability
is defined as the ratio of the time that the system is oper-
ational to the total amount of time that it is, or may be,
needed. The total time is the sum of the usable time and
downtime for maintenance/repair as shown in equation 3.1.
Availability = . "P*- 1™ (3#1)
uptime + downtime
Downtime is the result of a number of maintenance/repair
actions. The average downtime is sometimes called the
mean time to repair (MTTR) and it includes both scheduled
and nonscheduled downtimes. Availability can also be ex-
pressed as the ratio of the mean time between failures (MTBF)





The key to the relation between availability and reliability
is the MTBF. The greater the reliability, the better the
availability, given that MTTR can be held fairly stable.
For the purposes of system availability calculations,
all repeaters are assumed identical and their availabilities
were taken as equal. Similarly, the availability of all
paths are taken as equal where P(C^)=P(B.)=P(A^)=aL . Re-
peater module availability is labeled a with data path
availability a and station availability a . Total system
availability for TMR is labeled 3^™.
a. TMR AVAILABILITY CALCULATION
Referring to Figure III-l, it can be seen that
TMR System availability is calculated as a function of the
repeater module availabilities and the data path module
availabilities. Since the data path module itself is
triply parallel redundant, the availability of the data





The availability of the station (a ) is the product of the
s
availabilities of the repeater and data path modules:
a = a *a (3.4)
s r p

Having knowledge of the station availability,
the overall system availability for TMR (aT^) can now be
ascertained:
where N = the number of stations on the ring system;
For example, with a, = .99, a .98 and N=5,







To compare the TMR System availability data with
a similar system with no redundant characteristics, the
following calculations are presented:
Given: a = .98,
r '
aT = a = .99L p
N = 5







= (.98) (.99) = .97





Although TMR enhances system availability, a
serious potential weakness in TMR is created by the unique-
ness of the repeater module (r) . From Figure III-l it can
be seen that all triply redundant data path modules (p) must

interface directly with station repeater modules. If one
repeater module were disabled, all data paths would be
interrupted.
This situation could be alleviated if repeater
modules were connected in different sequences. Methods
could be devised to utilize selected alternate paths to
bypass defective repeater modules without interrupting over-
all system operations. The Triply Redundant Multiple Path
(TRMP) system configuration for distributed rings provides
a possible solution to this situation.
2. Triply Redundant Multiple Path (TRMP) System Design
Figure III-2 shows a TRMP system of five stations,
having three path redundancy. Only one of the three out-
going data paths from each repeater module links with the
immediately succeeding repeater module (see Figure III-2,
path C
,
for example). A second outbound path links with
the second successive repeater module, skipping past one
module (Figure III-2, path B~) . The third outbound path
skips the first and second modules /stations and links with
the third successive module (Figure III-2, path A_) . Note
that each path emanating from every repeater module is labeled
A. or B or C , where i is the number of repeater.
i i i
In future discussion a path C will be said to have














distance of three, referring to the difference between the
sequence numbers of the originating and terminating stations.
The actual physical lengths of the paths may have any rela-
tionship, depending on the placement of stations in the ship.
The arrangement of data paths in relation to station
number is the key to TRMP. With TRMP it is possible for
two consecutive repeater modules to be inoperative while
still having the system working. In addition, it is possible
to have combinations of paths and repeaters inoperable while
still maintaining an operational system overall.
In a shipboard environment with TRMP distributed
ring systems, any ship could sustain damage at many points
throughout the ring system with data paths and repeater
modules alike being rendered inoperative. It must be
pointed out, however, that it could be possible to disrupt
all system operation in a battle damage environment through
selective disabling of repeater modules and data paths.
However, the flexibility of TRMP in coping with potential
damage and/or maintenance requirements presents significant
advantages over systems with little or no redundancy or
even with those having TMR characteristics. This fact will
be borne out in later studies of availability calculations.
Because of the unique arrangement of paths in TRMP,
only certain numbers of stations may be included in the
35

overall system (stations in this sense refer only to the
ring repeater module connections on the ring) . If the
number of stations were even, a complete circuit of dis-
tance-two links could be formed which locks out half the
stations. Similarly, if the number of stations were a
multiple of three, a complete circuit of distance-three
links could be formed which locks out two thirds of the
stations. See Figures III-3 and III-4 for illustration.
The limitation on TRMP then, is that the number of
stations on the entire ring system cannot be divisible by
two or three. In actual applications, dummy stations could
be inserted into the ring to ensure that this limiting
condition is met.
a. TRMP OPERATING SEQUENCE
In the TRMP system each station utilizes a
switch to select which of the three paths will be monitored
for the incoming signal. Outbound data is transmitted on
all three outgoing paths. If a station receives degraded
or disrupted signals on the path being monitored, it waits
until it has timed out or received a second unsuccessful
transmission on that path and then switches to an alternate
path and repeats the sequence. If all three input paths to
a particular station are disrupted, that station receives no
further messages and outputs a priority message to the ring
36

FIGURE III - 3. TRMP WITH A MULTIPLE OF TWO STATIONS
FIGURE III - 4. TRMP WITH A MULTIPLE OF THREE STATIONS
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via its three outgoing paths. This message indicates the
condition, thus alerting the system users that one particu-
lar station is unable to receive or transmit any further
messages. In TRMP, while the station in question is cut
off from the system, the system continues to function be-
cause two alternate paths which bypass the inoperative
station allow a continuity of message transmission around
the ring.
b. TRMP AVAILABILITY CALCULATION DEVELOPMENT
The calculation of system availability for TRMP
is not nearly as straight forward as TMR. From Figure III-2
it will be seen that TRMP is organized with transmission
device interfaces /repeaters represented by circles labeled
r. and data paths represented by directed arcs labeled A.
or B. or C.. All devices are identical in construction and
i 1
all data paths are identical as well. A message sequence
begins by specifying which of the devices and paths are
operational and which are not. Therefore, the first question
that must be addressed is, what is the probability that at
least one station on the ring is operational (a station in
this sense being a combination of host computer and ring
repeater) . This event will be called S- and its probability




The probability that a given station is opera-
tional can be expressed as one minus the probability that









\ In a distributed ring system where station
failures are independent, where individual stations are
linked in a serial manner, and where each station in the
ring has the same probability of being operational, the











where N is the total number of stations on the ring.
It follows that the probability of at least one
station in the system being operational is one minus the



















In calculating the probability that a given
message will successfully transit the ring, some ground
rules have to be established. First, each device (ring
repeater) functions throughout the message sequence with
probability p independent of all other devices. Similarly,
each data path functions successfully for a message sequence
with individual, independent probability q. Thus, for N
devices and associated data paths, a message sequence begins
by creation of a message by a functioning device. Each
other device may or may not be functioning. The message
proceeds by passing over functioning data paths and through
functioning repeaters until the message succeeds in again
reaching its creating device.
The problem is to determine the probability of
a system such that any given message sequence will succeed
with specified probabilities in p and q and system size N.
In Figure III-5, which is a linear representation
of TRMP, data paths and repeater modules have been labeled
to facilitate the calculation of system availability which
will follow. To simplify the overall concepts of TRMP,
the linear description previously seen is modified in
















As shown in Figure III-6, transmission through the indi-
vidual station (d.) is taken as a pair of events, reception
(r.) and transmission (t.).
d.
1
Figure III -6. TRMP Event Structure
The calculation of the probability of system
success will use a recursive technique beginning at the
origin of the message (at the left in the directed arc dia-
gram, Figure III-5) and proceeding for each event to define
the characterization of success. It can be seen that with
a triplicated path structure it would be possible for a
message to make three complete passes around the ring prior
to achieving a successful transit. Therefore a characteri-




In the derivation shown in Table III-l, based
on a system depicted in Figures III-5 and III-6, station 5
will initiate the original message.
In Table III-l each event is doubly subscripted
(r.- or t..). The subscript i represents the specific event
number and will vary up to the maximum number of stations on
the ring. The subscript j indicates on which of the three
passes an event is occurring. For example, r is the re-
ception at station 3 on pass 1 around the ring and t~o is
the transmission from station 3 on pass 3 around the ring.
Referring to Table III-l, it can be seen in the
originating pass, that successful reception at station 1,
(r..-), of a message originating at station 5 is defined as
the event, link C. is up. The message is transmitted from
station 1 if it is received (r....) and passes through the
repeater (d ) :
i
t,, = r-^A d^ (written r^d^)
Correct reception at station 2 can come via the
distance-two link from station 5, (B ) , or via the distance-
one link through station 1, (C^t-, ,) :
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From the calculations in Table III-l, a generic
recurrence in each of the three passes through the system
after event r, is found to be:
rij Ai-2 H-3.J v B i-j H-2,j v ci*i-l,j
tlfj = rlfj dt (3.9)
This recurrence is relatively easy to use for
computing system availability by substituting repeater
availabilities for d. and data path availabilities for A.,
i 1
B., C.. This process will be discussed more fully later in
this section. The main point to remember at this juncture,
however, is that if the above concept is applied to a com-
puter program, the values of r. and t. are easily stored
as linear arrays and the computational effort increases
linearly with N.
Combination of the probability of success for
each of the three passes will give the probability that a
successful message sequence will occur on the originating




rNl v rN2 v rN3
where N = Maximum number of stations in the system.
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In terms of probability this same formula is expressed as:
P(S2) = l-(l-rN1)(l-rN2)(l-rN3 ) (3.10)
Having previously calculated the probability
that at least one station is operational, P(S..), and the
probability of a successful message sequence P(S ) , the
overall probability of system success or availability of






c. TRMP EVENT CHARACTERIZATIONS AS PROBABILITY
EXPRESSIONS
After development of event characterizations for
three system passes, it is necessary to calculate the system
probability of success.
The probability of any given successful event
from Table III-l is expressed in terms of the probabilities
that certain components are available, and the probabilities
of preceeding events. The availabilities of all paths are
assumed equal: P(A.) = P(B.) = P(C.) = a, (for all i) . Like-
J. X J. Li
wise, the probability that each repeater is functioning is
assumed the same for each station: P(d.) = a . For example,
i/ r r »
the event characterization r..
1
is expressed as r, ,=C . The
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probability of event r, , is P(r.
1
)=P(C )=a . Likewise the
probability of event d. is P(d.) =a .
Paths and repeaters are assumed to fail inde-
pendently so that,
P(tu ) = P(diril ) = PCdjTPCr^ = aA
The events that "the repeater is operational"
and "the path is operational" are not mutually exclusive
events however, so the probability of event












aL L ar " aL ar
Thus the probabilities of each of the successive event
characterizations in Table III-l can be expressed in terms
of a_ and aT :r Li
hi = V21 =P(t21 } =P(d2)* P(r21>
= a
r
(aL + aL ar " aL aP
2 2 3 2
= a a, + aT a - aT ar L L r L r
Proceeding similarly,
r41




P(r41 ) = l-(l-P(C4t31))(l-(l-(l-P(B3t21))(l-P(A2t11))))
,- 3 2,2 ,53 63.
( l-aT a +aT a +aT a -aT a )Lr Lr Lr Lr
At this point the development of this event
characterization was abandoned due to the obvious complexity
which had developed and which was increasing with each event.
A simple and straightforward computer program was
written to calculate the probabilities of the event character-
izations in Table III-l. In each pass, the first few events
differ, but most of the calculations are repeated applica-
tions of Equation 3.9. The program was written in Fortran
IV and used double precision floating point variables. The
results of this program are tabulated in the following sec-
tion in the format of system availability curves illustrating
TRMP system availability as a function of system size, re-
peater availability and data path availability.
3. System Availability Comparisons
The data projected in Figure III-7 illustrates the
distinctive advantage that TRMP has over TMR or non-redundant
systems. One of the more important aspects that should be
















































availability (approximating .99) even when repeater and data
path availability is in the range of 0.8. Additionally, it
should be noted that a TRMP configuration of 101 stations
is only slightly different from the TRMP system of 11 sta-
tions and for this larger number of stations, TRMP availa-
bility far exceeds that of TMR or non-redundant systems at
all values of repeater/data path availability.
Figure III-8 graphically illustrates the TRMP system
probability of failure (1 minus the availability) for systems
of varied size and repeater/data path availabilities exceed-
ing 0.9. System probability of failure is graphed instead
of system availability because at repeater and data path
availabilities exceeding 0.9, the system availability be-
comes close to 1. Here again the relative closeness of a
TRMP system of 101 stations to the system of 11 stations
illustrates how a larger number of stations do not signifi-
cantly affect the high overall system availability for TRMP.
It should be noted that TMR and non-redundant configurations
were not plotted as their availability curves would appear
as nearly vertical lines on the extreme right edge of the
figure.
4. Shipboard Data Multiplex System
A system currently under evaluation for the U.S„
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System (SDMS) is similar in many respects to the Distributed
Ring Computing System with TRMP (DRCS/TRMP). Intended to
be a general purpose data transfer system for shipboard
use, SDMS has a modular redundant design. In SDMS there are
five separate bus lines (data paths) for a redundant data
path transmission capability, whereas DRCS/TRMP utilizes
three way redundant paths . While the two approaches are
similar in concept they are far different in application.
In the SDMS configuration, redundant data paths are both
time-division and frequency-division multiplexed whereas
distributed ring systems have a single, time shared digital
communication stream. Another aspect of path redundancy
where SDMS and DRCS/TRMP differ is in the manner and sequence
in which stations are interconnected.
One area where the systems differ little is that
both systems have totally asynchronous and distributed con-
trol of message traffic. Just as in DRCS/TRMP, SDMS has no
central processing device which by failing can interrupt
data transfer. It has been designed so that failure modes
result in a gradual and graceful degradation of system
availability rather than a sudden loss of information
transfer.
Regardless of their differences, however, each sys-
tem does provide a higher degree of reliability and
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survivability in the information transfer function than do
current shipboard systems. In comparing the two systems
for overall availability, it is found that both function
with very high levels of availability. DRCS/TRMP availa-
bility approximates .9999999 when data path and ring repeater
availabilities are greater than .95. When repeater availa-
bility is increased to .999 the probability of system
failure approaches 10 . Repeater availabilities approxi-
mating .999 are reasonable as will be shown in Chapter IV.
SDMS, on the other hand, produces an availability in the
vicinity of .9999999999. In SDMS, system availability is
a measure of the overall system's ability to process
90 per cent of the normal rated traffic demand expected
of the system.
For information on the specific system design
specifications and operational capabilities of SDMS, the
interested reader should consult reference 14.
With a system based on low-risk electronic tech-
nology and with many other design principles of DRCS/TRMP,
SDMS is worth further investigation as one offshoot of dis-
tributed system technology. Its emergence as a viable infor-
mation transfer system in a shipboard environment indicates




IV. PROPOSED RING REPEATER DESIGN
A. FUNCTIONAL ANALYSIS OF PROPOSED RING REPEATER DESIGN
The ring repeater discussed throughout this thesis is
designed to connect directly to the incoming ring cable,
receive the signal, recover clocking information, and pass
on reshaped (and possibly retimed) data to the outbound
cable. To design the repeater, then, one must know what
type of cable is to be used, what transmission distances
are required, what type of driver/ receivers are to be used
and what transmission speeds are used.
A repeater designed to carry out the functions of TRMP
was derived mainly from a repeater design discussed by
Harris /Ref. 4, p. 8Q7 and is diagrammed in Figure IV- 1.
Since most developmental work and testing was conducted
by Harris no such efforts were conducted during this study.
For the purposes of this thesis, the basic design was
analyzed from a component availability perspective in an
effort to develop the data required for overall system
availability.
The function and purposes of the various components of






Only a single high speed bitstream is transmitted in
this self-clocking ring system. This would suggest the use
of single wire, coaxial cable, twisted pair or fiber optic
transmission media. Of these four, only the last three are
worth considering due to their high immunity to the problems
of electromagnetic interference in the shipboard environment.
All three of these transmission media are capable of trans-
mitting data at the speed required on board ships and all
possess very low failure rates.
Data Path Selection Switch
The purpose of this switch is simply to select the desired
data path based on the quality of messages received. It is
basically a 3:1 multiplexer which accepts twisted pair inputs
and outputs to a bypass relay. Data path selection is deter-
mined by the ring interface.
Bypass Relays
The purpose of the bypass relays is to simply switch




Line Drivers and Receivers
Integrated circuit line drivers and receivers are
readily available from many sources. The receiver accepts
twisted pair inputs and provides a TTL output to interface
with standard logic circuits. The driver accepts a TTL
input and transmits to twisted pair cable.
Recent advancements in optoelectronics have produced
optically isolated receivers with very high immunity to
noise. While earlier models were restricted to lower
data rates, recent models now are capable of megabit speeds
and are relatively inexpensive. These optically isolated
receivers are compatible with many of the differential
drivers now on the market. With the increased interest in
fiber optic technology this option may prove to be the best
way to proceed in future designs.
One Bit Delay
The one bit delay is a single flip flop driver at the
recovered clock rate and serves to retrieve the received
signal before retransmission.
Clock Recovery Unit
The recovery unit recovers clocking information from
the incoming data stream. The bitstream in the ring is
self-clocking in that frequent one-zero (and zero-one)
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signals are guaranteed during incoming messages. Clock
pulses can be regenerated at these transitions. Data bits
on the ring are sent in 2 bit periods as shown:
M^^^Uone" bit : '110 j
"zero" bit : i 1 1 i
During receipt of the tokens (CTL, SOM, EOM) up to
three bit periods may pass with no transitions. The clock
recovery circuitry provides the sufficient "inertia" to
continue with minimal frequency drift during these periods.
Crystal Clock
The 3.58 MHZ "TV" Crystal, crystal clock mechanism used
in this repeater design is very stable and rather inexpen-
sive. With proper division it would be used to provide a
reference for the digital phase-locking in the clock
recovery unit.
Output Multiplexer
A two-to-one multiplexer is used to route ring data from
the delay flip-flop to the ring or from the ring interface
to the ring. The multiplexed path is controlled by the
connect /disconnect line from the ring interface. Note that
the ring interface in Figure IV- 1 "listens" to the passing
data, watching for a CTL token, before entering the ring
58

(switching the multiplexer to "connect mode"). In this
manner the ring data in line is always valid (when the
repeater is not bypassed) and is derived from the output
of the delay flip-flop.
1, Availability Analysis of Proposed Ring Repeater
Components
Throughout earlier system availability discussions
in this thesis, the availability of the ring repeater has
always been a central or key element to all calculations.
Whether TMR or TRMP, the degree of availability of the
ring repeater had significant impact on the overall system
availability. Realizing the importance of the repeater in
availability calculations, it is vital, when designing a
repeater configuration, to design a unit that would provide
the desired service and also provide that service as much
of the time as possible.
As can be gathered from previous discussions on the
subject, reliability is the problem at all levels of elec-
tronics, from materials to operating systems. Reliability
of materials is an "involved" topic which will not be dis-
cussed here but it is sufficient to say that in reliability
of operating systems, it is often found that system relia-
bilities have to be known prior to system use. For example,
it can be seen that the reliability of an electronic component
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is known with certainty after it has been used in the field
until it is worn out and its failure history has been re-
corded. But this approach has not proven very reasonable
in situations where the demands of technology required
immediate use of electronic components. There was not time
to run life cycle evaluation on the component to judge
its reliability.
There is then a need to be able to predict the relia-
bility of a component to a very accurate degree. A funda-
mental limitation on this prediction process is the ability
to accumulate data of known validity. Another limitation
is exerted by the type of prediction technique used. Very
simple techniques omit a great deal of detail and the predic-
tion suffers inaccuracies. More detailed techniques can
become so bogged down in detail that the prediction effort
becomes too costly or worse, causes delay in actual hardware
development.
For the military application there is a set of
definitive guidelines to reliability prediction for elec-
tronic components. These guidelines, found in reference 13,
take into account the specific types of electronic components




The reliability prediction formula used in the
following pages comes from reference 13 and reflects the
overall device (component) failure rate for MOS Digital
SSI/MSI devices. From component failure rates, it will be
possible through standard availability calculation methods
to eventually ascertain whether the design will meet re-
quirements for reliable performance in the TRMP system. A
failure rate will be calculated for each component in the
proposed ring repeater design. These failure rates will
then be transformed into component availabilities. With
these individual availabilities, the overall ring repeater
availability will be calculated.
a. REPEATER COMPONENT FAILURE RATE AND AVAILABILITY
CALCULATIONS
For MOS Digital SSI /MSI devices the individual
device failure rate ( A« ) is specified by:
K = ^L^^-rC^) (4.1)
where
:
Xp - is the device failure rate in failures per 10
hours
,
TT. - is the device learning factor. It applies values
based on whether device technology is new or time
tested (new is usually considered to be less than
6 months old) .
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TTq - is the device quality factor. Depending on
which MIL-SPEC standard, if any, is applied
to the device it assigns an appropriate value.
77 - is the temperature acceleration factor. Its
value depends on device technology as well as
the expected temperature range in the environ-
ment in which the device will be located.
JT - is the application environment multiplier. Its
values are determined by the application environ-
ment in which the device will operate.
C^,C« - are the circuit complexity factors. Values are
assigned based on the number of gates within
the device.
In using the formula for Ap > the individual parameter
values are determined from appropriate tables found in
reference 13.
In Table IV-1 the failure rate and availability
for each individual component is calculated.
For all calculations in this table^T/l (device
quality) was set at a value of 150 (commercial or non-MIL-
SPEC parts) with no screening beyond the manufacturers
regular quality assurance. 77^ (learning factor) was set
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received this rating. 77^ (environment factor) was set at
5.0 to conform with a Naval unsheltered environment which
would be the worst case encountered on a shipboard platform,
7TT (temperature acceleration factor) was set at .25 to
conform with an expected ambient temperature of 90°F, again
a worst case situation. Circuit complexity factors (C, and
C«) were a function of the individual number of gates per
device and as such varied from device to device.
To illustrate the calculation process, take for
example the line receiver. Signetics Corporation device
DM 8820 was chosen as a representative component for this
calculation. Device DM 8820 has 2 gates which equates to
complexity factors of C = .0021 and C = .0050. All other
variables being as stated previously, equation 4.1 results
in Ap = 3.82875 failures/ 10 hours. To find the number of
failures per hours ( \ ) , Ap is multiplied by 10 . MTBF
is then found by taking the inverse of A . Having calcu-
lated component MTBF it is essential to translate this in-
formation into an availability value. The equation
originally considered in determining component availability
was of the form:
Availability = »_-_—
, >XTTirT1T, (4.2)J MTBF + MTTR
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MTBFDirect calculation of the form A =
MTBF + MTTR
is quite simple. When MTTR « MTBF, an approximation is
more practical:
MTBF /-*_ ! _ MTTR . .. ^
MTBF + MTTR ^ MTBF
In the case of the proposed ring interface design,
the MTTR is expected to approximate one hour. This means,
of course, that MTTR is significantly less than MTBF, so
the approximation form is used in all calculations for
component availability.
To continue with the actual calculations of
component availability, equation 4.3 is applied with MTTR =
1 hour. Device availability then, is found to be .99996.
What remains is to calculate the overall availability of
the ring repeater using all the individual component avail-
abilities generated in Table IV-1.
b. CALCULATION OF THE PROPOSED RING REPEATER
AVAILABILITY
From Figure IV-1 it can be seen that repeater
availability is, in fact, a serial calculation. Having
calculated individual component availabilities it is neces-
sary to first calculate the clock recovery unit availability
from its components and then calculate the parallel avail-
ability of the two data path selector devices.
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The clock recovery unit availability is a serial
calculation which results in a unit availability of .99979.
The data path selector device has an individual availability
of .99992. The availability of the parallel combination of
those devices is .999999993. Applying these two availability
values as well as the remaining component availability values
in Table III-l to Figure IV-1, the repeater availability is
.99933.
2. Increasing Repeater Availability
While the calculated availability for the proposed
ring repeater is .99933, this value in practice is not as
high as would be desired. There are of course, several
alternative approaches which can be used to bolster re-
peater availability. First would be to consider components
of high reliability as reflected in higher levels of the
Military Specification (MIL-SPEC) program. It should be
noted that components utilized in calculation of the pro-
posed repeater availability were of commercial, non-MIL-
SPEC quality. To illustrate, consider the line receiver
device (DM 8820) used in the proposed repeater design.
Using a commercial configuration, it can be seen from
Table III-l that device availability is .99996. Now,
utilizing an otherwise similar device satisfying the most
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rigid MIL-SPEC standards, formula 4.1 yields an availability
of .9999997.
A second way to increase repeater availability
would be to make the entire design more redundant. That is,
instead of single devices (as presently proposed) , install
all devices in parallel. Again to illustrate the effects,
the existing proposed design with only the selector device
in a redundant configuration, has a unit availability of
.99933. By installing every device in parallel using the
same commercial quality devices, the resultant repeater
availability would be .9999948.
Further calculations are not necessary to conclude
that even higher availabilities could be achieved through
combination of more rigid MIL-SPEC criteria and more
redundant configurations
.
One last option for enhancement of repeater avail-
ability would be the development of a single integrated
circuit device which would accomplish the functions of the
repeater. This approach would significantly reduce the
number of gates as well as the complexity factors and as a
result would increase repeater availability. Any attempt
to predict an availability for such a device would be pre-
liminary as the final number of gates (complexity) would be
subject to final design specifications of the manufacturer.
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In summary, while the availability for the proposed
repeater design is well within limits to ensure high over-
all TRMP System availability, there exist several avenues
for enhancement of present or anticipated repeater designs.
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V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The main purpose of this thesis was to study the feasi-
bility of enhancing ring structured distributed computing
systems by initiating a high degree of redundancy in order
to provide high availability necessary for insuring compat-
ibility with shipboard environments. A background study,
overview and functional description of distributed ring
software and hardware were presented in Chapter II. The
major system constraints and environmental problems likely
to be encountered in a shipboard environment were described,
together with potential approaches for solving these diffi-
culties, in the earlier sections of Chapter III. Specific
designs utilizing data path redundancy for increased system
availability were discussed and calculations for each design
were explained in the later sections of Chapter III.
One such data path design, Triply Redundant Multiple
Path (TRMP)
,
provided significantly improved system avail-
ability even when individual components of the system were
exhibiting unrealistically low availabilities. The TRMP
configuration, when coupled with the distributed, asynchronous
control philosophy of the distributed ring computing system,
would provide a highly reliable approach to network
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architecture in shipboard platforms while providing the
full benefits of graceful degradation associated with the
distributed control concept.
While TRMP appears feasible, there are still many
aspects of this design that require further study. It is
recommended that further investigation be conducted in
the areas of system software and communication protocols
for a TRMP type system. In addition, the development of
software diagnostics to aid in fault isolation is a key
feature to the continued development of this concept.
Practical implementations of distributed ring computing
systems can be expanded to include TRMP data path configura-
tions so that actual system availability data based on real
time application will be available.
In conclusion, it is felt that TRMP provides the degree
of redundancy in ring structured systems to ensure high
availability in shipboard environments. Even at system
repeater and data path availabilities approximating .8,
TRMP delivers significantly higher availabilities than
other configurations considered. With repeater architecture
as simple in design as it is, a repeater availability at
or exceeding .999 is attainable. Given this level of com-
ponent availability, TRMP meets even the highest standards
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